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T

HE 1998 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference ofPlenipoten,
tiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, l is a massive
document containing one hundred and twenty, eight Articles. The Interna,
tional Criminal Court (ICC) will have under its mandate some of the most seri,
ous international crimes known to humankind. It is intended to serve the triple
function of deterrence, prosecution of alleged perpetrators, and justice for vic,
tims. By individualizing guilt, the ICC will have the potential effect of search,
ing for truth and assisting in peace and reconciliation. It is hoped that the
providing of accountability will end the cycle of impunity, protect the funda,
mentals of human dignity, and work for peace. Deciding where my focus should
be for this contribution to honour my colleague, friend, and mentor in many
ways in the international criminal law field, Professor L.C. Green, was a diffi,
cult choice. I decided to pick what turned out to be one of the most, if not the
most, controversial Article at the end of the Conference-Article 12.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

The Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court
Article 12 of the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court, dealing
with the preconditions for the actual exercise of criminal jurisdiction, is fun~
damental to an effective International Criminal Court. The views of States
on this issue were wide~ranging. Until the proverbial eleventh hour on July 17,
1998, in Rome, where, under the Rules of Procedure of the Conference, the
text had to be adopted by midnight, Article 12 was still a make or break provi~
sion. Even subsequent to the adoption of the Statute, it retains its notoriety}
Article 12 is intimately related to Article 5 on crimes within the jurisdiction
of the ICC, Article 13 on exercise of jurisdiction, Article 17 on
complementarity, and Article 124 on the transitional provision. In effect, these
provisions dealing with the intertwined aspects of jurisdiction "were the most
complex and most sensitive, and for that reason remained subject to many op~
tions as long as possible."3 They were, beyond doubt, indicative of the necessity
to adopt a package~deal. The approach taken is firstly that the offence ratione
materiae is found in the list of core crimes contained in Article 5 and defined in
Articles 6, 7 and 8. Secondly, the preconditions for the ICC exercising jurisdic~
tion in the specific case must be met. Thirdly, the case must be initiated in ac~
cordance with the provisions of Article 13.
From the Draft Statute of the International Law Commission (ILC)4, to the
Draft Statute prepared by the Preparatory CommitteeS (PrepCom), and finally
to the negotiations at the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipo~
tentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in Rome
from June 15-J uly 17, 1998, 6 a fundamental issue during all stages of the debate
was whether in cases other than where the situation was referred to the Prose~
cutor by the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter,7 the ICC would have vested in it inherent jurisdiction
to prosecute the core crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity
and aggression, listed in Article 5, on account of ratification or acceptance of
the Statute. Alternatively, would State consent be a precondition, and, if so,
for which crimes, on what basis, and by which State or States?
The aim of this short Article is to analyse Article 12, which sets forth pre~
conditions to the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC, by considering the various
options that were put on the table, beginning with the work of the Interna~
tional Law Commission, followed by the Ad Hoc Committee and the Prepara~
tory Committee (Prep Com) set up by the United Nations General Assembly,
and culminating in the negotiations during the Rome Diplomatic Conference.
It is only through this chronological progression that one can see the divergent
perspectives of States and the ultimate compromise that was struck to save the
Statute in the final stages of the Rome Conference.

540

Sharon A. Williams
The Route to Rome

The Early Years. The establishment of an international criminal court has
been on the agenda of the international community since at least the time of
the League of Nations. Although there are examples of war crimes and crimes
against peace prosecutions stemming from the thirteenth century in Europe, 8
the contemporary impetus to establish an international criminal court may be
said to have originated from the century old 1899 first Hague Convention for
the Pacific Settlement ofInternational Disputes.9 However, it was the 1919
Treaty ofVersailles lO that saw for the first time an attempt at the prosecution of
war crimes. Attempt is the operative word, as Kaiser Wilhelm II remained in
the Netherlands where he had sought asylum, and the other prosecutions were
eventually with the agreement of the allies brought before the German
Supreme Court in Leipzig. II
In 1937 the League of Nations attempted to bring into operation a multilat,
eral Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism and an an,
nexed Protocol on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court to
deal with such offences.!2 Neither came into force. 13 However, in 1945, the aI,
lied powers adopted the London Charter l4 and set up the International Mili,
tary Tribunal which sat at Nuremberg. It provided a forum for the trials of the
major axis war criminals whose crimes had no precise geographical location. A
tribunal was set up on similar lines in Tokyo for the far east theatre of war. IS
These two tribunals were ad hoc with a determined time frame-the war period
that had just ended. They were not truly "international" in character, with the
judges and prosecutors being drawn only from France, the United Kingdom,
the United States, and the former U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, the Nuremberg
Charter, Judgment and the Principles extrapolated therefrom by the Interna,
tional Law Commission and accepted by the United Nations General
Assemblyl6 are an extremely pertinent precedent. This was the first task given
the ILC, which had been created by the General Assembly in 1947. It was also
mandated to formulate a Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Secu,
rity of Mankind and "to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an
international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide and
other crimes."17
The conclusion of the ILC was that such a body was desirable and possible.
In 1950 the General Assembly established a Committee on International
Criminal Jurisdiction to prepare a concrete proposal. A draft statute was sub,
mitted in 1951, and amended in 1953, but was not accepted, ostensibly because
of a failure to agree on an acceptable definition of the crime of aggression. 18
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Even though this was done by the General Assembly in 1974,19 still the matter
of the ICC remained dormant.

The ILC Draft. The 1994 Draft Statute ZO for an international criminal court
produced by the International Law Commission was complicated and geared
towards producing a court that would operate on a restrictive consent basis and
with strict Security Council control under Article 23. Article 21 (1) (a)
provided for inherent jurisdiction in a case of genocide, with no additional
requirement of acceptance.2 1 However, Article 21 (1) (b) stipulated that the
Court could exercise its jurisdiction for the other crimes referred to in Article
20-namely aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and certain
treaty crimes-where the complaint was brought in accordance with Article 25
(2) and the jurisdiction of the Court over the particular crime was accepted
under Article 22 by the custodial State and by the State on the territory of
which the act or omission in question occurred, a type of "ceded jurisdiction."zz
The term "custodial State" was intended to cover not only the situation where
a State has detained a person or has the person in its control, but also would
extend to a State the armed forces of which are visiting another State. In the
latter case, where a member of the visiting force is suspected of a crime the
State to which the force belongs would be classified as the "custodial State."
The inclusion of treaty crimes based on the various international terrorism
conventions Z3 and the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances z4 rendered it broader than
Article 5 of the Rome Statute as adopted. In a case where the custodial State
had received a request Z5 under an international agreement from another State
to surrender a person for the purposes of prosecution, unless the request was
rejected, acceptance by the requesting State of the Court's jurisdiction was
required. Article 22 of the ILC Draft detailed the modalities of acceptance by
States Parties. It can be classified as an "opting in" system with States specifying
the crimes for which jurisdiction was accepted. z6 The Court did not have
inherent jurisdiction, therefore, based on a State ratifying or acceding but,
instead, needed a special declaration issued either at the time of becoming a
Party or later. The ILC was of the view that this best reflected its general
approach to the Court's jurisdiction, Z7 that it is based on State consent with the
"Court intervening upon the will of the States concerned, rather than
whenever required for protecting the interests of the international
community."zs Article 23 (1) provided for referral to the Court by the United
Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for
crimes referred to in Article 20. With respect to aggression, Article 23 (2)
542

Sharon A. Williams
detailed the prerequisite that the Security Council first determine that a State
had committed aggression before a complaint of, or directly related to, an act of
aggression could be brought. In conclusion, the consent regime in the ILC
Draft was criticized as being "complicated and cumbersome at best [and likely]
to cripple the proposed Court at worst.,,29 This being said, it must be realized
that the ILC, based on the past views of States' expressed in the Sixth
Committee of the General Assembly on its annual Reports, was cognizant of
the fact that the "instrument providing for an international criminal
jurisdiction must take into account current international realities ... that the
establishment and effectiveness of the court required the broad acceptance of
the statute by States.,,30

The Prep Com Draft. In both the Ad Hoc Committee3l set up by the UN
General Assembly to review the ILC 1994 Draft Statute and in the PrepCom
established in 1996,32 the same fundamental questions were raised. In the
PrepCom there was widespread, albeit not uniform, agreement that there
should be inherent jurisdiction over genocide.33 However, as in the Ad Hoc
Committee, there were different views on whether war crimes and crimes
against humanity should be so treated. 34 States supporting inherent
jurisdiction for all core crimes underscored the need for it because of the gravity
of the crimes. On the other hand, those States who were opposed stressed the
consensual nature of the Court and the necessity of such to obtain maximum
State support. The maintenance of State sovereignty was key to this position.
In fact, some States argued that the preconditions of State consent set out in
Article 21 (1) (b) of the 1994 ILC Draft should have been more expansive,
including also the mandatory consent of the States of nationaJity of the
accused and the victim.
In the Draft Report of the Intersessional Meeting in Zuphten,35 which was
produced to facilitate the last PrepCom session, the options on jurisdictional
preconditions were contained in Articles 6 [21] and 7 [21 bis] as produced by
the Working Groups of the PrepCom.36 The Articles had square brackets indi,
eating again various alternatives and the diverse views of States.
Rome 199B-The Options
The several options contained in the Draft Statute37 finalized at the last ses,
sion of the PrepCom on April 3, 1998, were put before delegations in the Com,
mittee of the Whole (CW). Broadly speaking, these can be categorized as "the
German Proposal," "the Korean Proposal," "the United Kingdom Proposal,"
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"the United States Proposal," and the "opt~in" and "case~by case" consent re~
gimes.3 8 These proposals ranged from universal jurisdiction for the ICC pro~
posed by Germany and automatic jurisdiction using broad bases of jurisdiction
by South Korea at one end of the spectrum to the restrictive mandatory con~
sent of all interested States preferred by certain other delegations. The Bureau
discussion paper tried to narrow the options, as did its subsequent proposal,
while still retaining alternatives.39 The final package struck a compromise.
Nevertheless, the then entrenched positions of some delegations proved to be
irreconcilable. The result was that the consensus approach to adoption was
thwarted and an unrecorded vote in plenary was called for late on July 17,
1998. The Statute was adopted by 120 in favour to 7 against with 21 abstentions.
Article 12 as adopted is not as restrictive as it could have been. Yet it still re~
quires, where the prosecutor acts proprio motu or where States, rather than the UN
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, refer a situation,
that either the territorial State where the crime was committed or the State of
nationality of the accused be Parties. If non~State Parties are involved, they
may accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC for the crime in question.
The Gennan Proposal. The German proposal was based on the rationale that
States individually have a legitimate basis at international law to prosecute the
core crimes listed in Article 5 on account of universal jurisdiction. It was
submitted that the ICC should have the same capacity as contracting States.
This would have been appropriate for a permanent International Criminal
Court being founded for the good of the international community of States as a
whole. The proposal was contained in Article 9 (1), further option, of the Draft
Statute before the CWo
It is a well~established rule of customary40 and conventional41 international
law that certain criminal conduct is against the universal interest, offends uni~
versal conceptions of public policy, and is universally condemned. Thus, the
perpetrators are hostis humanis generis, enemies of humankind. Any State ob~
taining custody over them has a legitimate ground to prosecute in the interest
of all States on account of the universal basis of jurisdiction over the offence.
States have "the legal competence and jurisdictional competence to define and
punish particular offences, regardless of whether that State had any direct con~
nection with the specific offences at issue."42 It appears to merge jurisdiction
over the person with jurisdiction over the offence.43 In this way, such serious
and heinous crimes will not escape justice by falling into a jurisdictional vac~
uum. There is no requirement that any other State or States involved in some
way through territorial location of the crime or nationality of the accused or
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victims must consent. The origins of the principle of universal jurisdiction can
arguably be traced to international piracy,44 the slave trade45 and more latterly
to war crimes,46 crimes against humanity,47 and genocide. 48 Most recently, the
prosecutions before the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the For~
mer Yugoslavia (ICTFY) and Rwanda (ICTR) illustrate this fundamental prin~
ciple. For example, as explained in the amicus curiae brief presented by the
United States in the T adic case, "The relevant law and precedents for the of~
fences in question here-genocide, war crimes and crimes against human~
ity-clearly contemplate international as well as national action against the
individuals responsible. Proscription of these crimes has long since acquired
the status of customary international law, binding on all States, and such
crimes have already been the subject of international prosecutions by the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals."49
More recently, in Prosecutor v. Furundzija, the ICTFY stated that the prohi~
bition against torture has "evolved into a peremptory norm or jus cogens . ..
Clearly, the jus cogens nature of the prohibition against torture articulates the no~
tion that the prohibition has now become one of the most fundamental standards
of the international community."50 As well, Lord Browne Wilkinson, speaking
with the majority in the House of Lords in Regina v. Bartle et al., ex parte
Pinochet, held that "the jus cogens nature of the international crime of torture
justifies States in taking universal jurisdiction over torture wherever committed."51
The German proposal attracted strong support from some delegations52 and
from many of the NGOs.53 The view central to this proposal was that to limit
the potential of the ICC by requiring some form of State consent beyond ratifi~
cation would detract from the effectiveness of the Court and even its rationale
and philosophical underpinnings. Thus, the impact of the German proposal
would have been to give the ICC universal jurisdiction54 over the listed crimes
with no need for a separate consent of interested States. As Germany indicated
in Rome,55 the universal principle's application would have eliminated loop~
holes. For example, if consent of at least the territorial State was necessary and
if genocide was committed in State X against nationals of State X, and X is not
a Party to the Statute and the United Nations Security Council does not refer
the matter to the ICC acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Char~
ter,56 the crime would not be cognizable by the Court. Similarly, it is true that
in the case of internal armed coriflicts, the territorial State and State of nation~
ality will often be one and the same. The ICC would only have jurisdiction if
that State had become a State Party before the conflict, agreed ad hoc due to
domestic political procedures, or if the Security Council acted under Chapter
VII.57 As well, the restrictions of State consent would mean that even where
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the custodial State was a Party to the Rome Statute and wanted to surrender
the accused to the ICC, the Court would not be able to exercise jurisdiction
without the consent of the other involved States.
If the German proposal had been marketable in Rome, the end result would
have been the deletion of Article 12 [Article 7 in the Draft Statute] on precon~
ditions. Related to this issue, it must be emphasized, is the safeguard contained
in Article 17 on complementarity. The ICC would have only exercised such
universal jurisdiction where a national system was unwilling or unable to inves~
tigate and/or prosecute effectively. Therefore, the universal principle would
not have divested national criminal courts of their primary role in prosecutions
of listed crimes.
Clearly, the universal principle would have given jurisdiction to the ICC if
the core crimes were committed in the territory of any State, Party or non~ Party
to the Statute. However, non~States Parties would have been under no inter~
national legal obligation to cooperate with the Court. Therefore, the second
prong of the German proposal contained in Article 9 (2) further option was
that non~States Parties may accept the obligation to cooperate on an ad hoc ba~
sis with respect to any listed crime. 58
The Korean Proposal. Sensing opposition to the German concept of universal
jurisdiction, the Republic of Korea's proposal59 appeared two days into the
Conference on June 17, 1998. It provided for so~called automatic jurisdiction.
The Korean view was that by becoming a Party a State would be considered to
have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC. The jurisdictional nexus was that
anyone or more of four involved States Parties have consented to the Court
exercising jurisdiction over a case: either the territorial State, State of
nationality of the accused, State of nationality of the victim, or custodial State.
This proposal differed from those that follow in that it allowed for the selective
consent by ratification of one of the four States, including the custodial State.
In real terms, there was no difference in philosophy between the German and
Korean proposals, as the universal principle is based solely upon the alleged
perpetrator being in the custody of the prosecuting State. The Korean proposal
enjoyed wide support,60 but was not acceptable to many States who wanted a
second layer of State consent.61
The United Kingdom Proposal. The United Kingdom,62 in further option for
Article 7 (1), provided for jurisdiction by States Parties of the ICC for crimes
listed in Article 5, with necessarily the same built~in safeguard of comple~
mentarity discussed above. However, in Article 7 (2), a further requirement
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where the situation was referred by a State Party to the Court or where the
Prosecutor initiated a prosecution proprio motu was that both the custodial
State and the State where the crime occurred consented to the jurisdiction of
the ICC by being States Parties. Concern had been expressed that to get the
cumulative consents would be difficult. 63 On June 19, 1998, the proposal was
amended to delete the custodial State.
The United States Proposal. In cases where a situation had been referred to the
ICC by a State Party or where the Prosecutor had initiated an investigation, the
United States supported64 as fundamental the consent of the territorial State
and the State of nationality of the accused person, or at a minimum only the
consent of the State of nationality.65 The United States insisted that the ICC
have no jurisdiction over the nationals of States that had not become a Party to
the Statute. It was argued that to do so would violate Article 34 of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties,66 as treaties cannot be binding on
non,Party third States. The position was that it would not be acceptable for
United States citizens to be accountable in a court not accepted by the United
States. The United States made it clear that it could not adhere to a text that
allowed for United States forces operating abroad to be brought even
conceivably before the ICC, where the United States had not become a Party
to the Statute. The United States position was that this would derogate from
the ability of the United States to act as a major player in multinational
humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Protection against frivolous and
arbitrary charges and other forms of inappropriate investigations and
prosecution was called for. It is worth observing, however, that the passive
personality basis of jurisdiction included in the Korean proposal would have
been a protective deterrent for such forces in giving jurisdictional acceptance
to the State of nationality of victims.
Of course, the United States position still left open referral of a situation by
the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter as pro,
vided for in Article 13 (b) of the Statute, subject of course to the veto of one of
the P5. This, in the United States' view, was the only way "to impose the
court's jurisdiction on a non, Party State."67 The proposal would have resulted
in an ICC controlled by the Security Council, a type of permanent ad hoc
criminal tribunal. 68 '
The United States position on the indispensable requirement of the accep,
tance of the State of nationality of the accused was not acceptable to the over,
whelming majority of States as it was seen as causing a probable paralysis of the ICC.
The U.S. concerhs were not assuaged by the provisions on complementarity
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contained in Article 17 of the Statute or on judicial cooperation in Article
98(2), which requires consent of the sending State as a precondition for the
surrender to the ICC by the "host" State of persons present in that State pursu~
ant to international agreements. This would have meant that U.S. forces on,
for example, peace~keeping or other missions abroad under Status of Forces
Agreem~nts would not have been susceptible to prosecution before the ICC
unless the United States consented.

Proposals. The State "opt~in" proposal in
Article 6(2), Article 7, option 1, and Article 9, option 1, of the Draft Statute

State

"opt~in"

and

Case~by~Case

was markedly different from the previous proposals as it required an actual
second consent other than being a Party to the Statute. This declaration of
consent over specified crimes could have been placed at the time of ratification
or at a later stage. The thrust of the proposal was that before the ICC could
assume jurisdiction, as many as five States potentially would have had to have
consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over the crime in
question: the custodial State; the territorial State; the State that had requested
extradition of the person from the custodial State, unless the request was
rejected; the State of nationality of the accused; and the State of nationality of
the victim. The ICC would have been less competent under this proposal than
States currently are under conventional and customary international law to
prosecute domestically, where the consent of other involved States is not
necessary.69
The case~by~case approach contained in Article 7, option 2 of the Draft
Statute would have needed the specific consent of the States outlined above in
the "opt~in" proposal. Ratification would, therefore, have had little meaning in
practical reality and States would have been able to make any individual im~
mune from consideration of the Court when it seemed politically desirable.
This proposal would have rendered the ICC ineffective in many cases.
In effect, both the "opt~in" and case~by~case proposals based on a second
State consent would have been jurisdiction "a la carte." They would have re~
sulted in practical terms in a significantly weakened Court, with the ICC most
often only having jurisdiction when the UN Security Council referred a situa~
tion to it, with the built~in Charter problem of the veto power of the P5. This
would have been particularly so should both proposals have been adopted and
States had preferred to follow the case~by~case approach. States, as a result,
could have ratified with no intention of ever allowing cases to go before the
Court. This would have resulted in an ineffectual Court and as well have "fo~
ment[edl selectivity and arbitrariness."70
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The Bureau Compromise
The Bureau discussion paper71 "had narrowed the range of options but had
deliberately taken a cautious approach."72 The ProposaF3 had likewise re,
tained several options. Both of these had dropped the German Proposal. 74 The
Bureau Proposal in Article 7(1) adopted the Korean Proposal for genocide
alone. For war crimes and crimes against humanity, three options were pre,
sented in Article 7 (2): (1) the Korean Proposal, (2) the acceptance by the terri,
torial and custodial States, and (3) the acceptance by the State of nationality of
the accused alone. Some States voiced strong objections against the Korean
Proposal stating that it was quasi,universal jurisdiction. It gave the ability to
four States, including the custodial State as a State Party, to give the Court ju,
risdiction standing alone. However, other States pointed out that it would
have been in keeping with the ability at international law of the custodial State
to prosecute itself for international crimes, stricto sensu. They viewed the other
options as too restrictive, in particular option 3 based on the State of national,
ity of the accused. As well, Article 7 bis on acceptance of jurisdiction, in both
the discussion paper for treaty crimes, and possibly for one or more of the core
crimes, and in option 2 of the Proposal for crimes against humanity and war
crimes, was controversial as it replicated the "opt,in" regime. Article 7 bis op,
tion 1 reproduced the automatic jurisdiction over all core crimes by States
Parties. Thus, as late as July 10, 1998, with only one week left, there was no
consensus. The United States and other States emphasized that "universal ju,
risdiction or any variant of it" was unacceptable. 75 .
The result was the introduction on July 17, 1998, into ~he final package by
the Bureau of a new Article on preconditions, the present Article 12 in the
Statute. It provides:
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in Article 5.
2. In the case of Article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), [referral of a situation to the
ICC by a State Party or an investigation by the Prosecutor proprio motu] the
Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are
Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in
accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or,
if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of
registration of that vessel or aircraft;
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(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
3. If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required
under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar,
accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in
question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any
delay or exception in accordance with Part 9.

This Article combines State acceptance of jurisdiction with preconditions
for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC. It disjunctively allows for the accep,
tance by being States Parties of one or more of the territorial State or the State
of nationality of the accused. The transitional provision contained in Article
124 was also part of the compromise to gain the agreement of France to the
Statute. 76 It provides that States Parties may opt out of the ICC's war crimes ju,
risdiction for a period of seven years when the alleged crimes were committed
on its territory or by its nationals. States that had lobbied for the "opt,in" ac,
ceptance and the preconditional conjunctive approach or solely the State of
nationality of the accused remained opposed. From the outset, issues of juris'
diction had been a key concern for the United States. 77 For the United States it
was the four words "one or more of" in Article 12(2) that caused the ultimate
dissent. It was on this issue that the United States proposed an amendment
during the last hours of the Conference in the CW.78 It read:
With respect to States not party to the Statute the Court shall have jurisdiction
over acts committed in the territory of a State not party, or committed by officials
or agents of a State not party in the course of official duties and acknowledged by
the State as such, only if the State has accepted jurisdiction in accordance with
this Article.

The amendment was resoundingly defeated by a no,action motion,79 adopted
by 113 in favour to 17 against, with 25 abstentions. In the plenary that
followed, the United States requested an unrecorded vote. The result was 120
in favour with 7 against and 21 abstentions. Those voting against included
China, Israel and the United States.
Article 12-An Interpretation
By becoming parties to the Statute, States accept the jurisdiction of the ICC for
the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression,
when the latter has been defined and adopted in accordance with Article 5 (2).80
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Article 12(1) follows option 1 of the Bureau Proposal in Article 7 bis. It, therefore, assumes the position of automatic jurisdiction over the listed crimes.
In cases where, pursuant to Article 13 (a) or (c), a situation is referred to the
Prosecutor by a State PartyBl or where the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation proprio motu,82 State acceptance is necessary. As discussed above, this
complex and controversial issue resulted at the end of the day in a compromise
put to the CW in the final package. It was an attempt by the Bureau to find a
middle ground between the opposite positions of States-between, on the one
hand, those who had for the most part a preference for universal jurisdiction or
a list of alternative States (territorial State, State of nationality of the accused
or the victim, and custodial State), where it was sufficient that one had accepted the Court's jurisdiction by ratifying, and, on the other, those who insisted on either State Party acceptance of the State of nationality of the
accused or even the stricter requirement that there be acceptance conjunctively from a list of States as had been proposed in the ILC Draft. 83 Article 12 as
adopted by the Conference is the accommodation that was struck. It reduced
the preconditions. The jurisdictional nexus is that either the territorial State or
the State of nationality of the accused are States Parties. These are the two primary bases of jurisdiction over the offence accepted by States in international
criminal law and are universally accepted. 84

State with territorial jurisdiction. Territorial jurisdiction is a manifestation of
State sovereignty.8S A State has plenary jurisdiction over persons, property,
and conduct occurring in its territory, subject only to obligations or limitations
imposed by internationallaw.86 This is the universally accepted working rule in
international criminal law and is found in bilateral extradition treaties and
multilateral conventions. 87 The territory of a State includes its land mass,
internal waters, twelve-nautical-mile maximum territorial sea, and the airspace
above all of the former. Jurisdiction is recognized in customary and
conventional international law as also extending to conduct committed on
board maritime vessels and aircraft registered in a State.88 Thus, if a listed
crime is committed in State A, a State Party to the ICC Statute, by a national of
State B, whether or not State B is a State Party, State A will have enabled the
ICC to take jurisdiction. This is so regardless of whether the alleged offender is
present in State A or in another custodial State Party.89
The ICC is not, as has been argued by the United States, therefore potentially taking jurisdiction over non-States Parties. It is not violating Article 34 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties,90 which provides that treaties
cannot bind third parties without their consent. When an alien commits a
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crime, whether a domestic common crime or an international crime, on the
territory of another State, a prosecution in the latter State is not dependent on
the State of nationality of the accused being a Party to the pertinent treaty or
otherwise consenting. 91 It is not a case of a non~State Party being bound, but
rather of the individual being amenable to the jurisdiction of the ICC because of
alleged crimes committed in the territory of a State Party. There is no rule of in~
ternationallaw prohibiting the territorial State from voluntarily delegating to the
ICC its sovereign ability to prosecute, by becoming a State Party of the Statute. 92
State of nationality of the accused. The active nationality basis of jurisdiction over
the offence is well~entrenched in the domestic law of the majority of States. By
virtue of such State practice and opinio juris, it is a permissive rule derived from
international custom that establishes extraterritorial jurisdiction.93 Civil law juris~
dictions provide for its use extensively and relate it to common crimes of a dom~
estic nature, as well as to international crimes against the common interests of
States. It is a corollary to the rule concerning the non~extradition of nationals
applied by these States. Common law States, on the other hand, use the nation~
ality basis for the most part only with regard to international crimes, stricto
sensu, such as are prescribed by international law as envisaged in Article 5 of the
Rome Statute and international treaty crimes, like those contained in the inter~
national terrorism conventions. 94 In this context it is universally accepted.
Non~States

Parties. In the case of non~State Parties, Article 12(3) follows the
ILC Draft, the PrepCom Draft Statute,95 and the Bureau Discussion Paper,96
and Proposa1.97 It provides that if such a State's acceptance is required under
the preceding paragraph, it may declare ad hoc its acceptance with respect to
the crime in question. Such a State is then obligated to cooperate with the ICC
in accordance with Part 9 of the Statute. Thus, the Statute does not infringe
upon the sovereignty of non~Party States. It is in compliance with the
customary and conventional rules on the law of treaties. It is, therefore, a
misconception that the Statute binds non~Parties. They are not obligated to
cooperate with the ICC.

A

rticle 12 is a product of compromise supported by the ovenvhelming
majority of States. It endeavours to satisfy the many interests that
were in evidence at the Rome Conference and before. Although far from per~
feet, it was all that was possible at the time. That the acceptance of the Statute
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by the custodial State does not act as a precondition for the exercise of jurisdic~
tion by the ICC is a serious gap.98 It is this provision that would have ensured
that atrocities will not go unpunished if the territorial State or State of nation~
ality are not Parties or do not consent ad hoc and there is no UN Security Coun~
cil referral. In all probability it may be assumed that the States likely to be the
locus delicti of such crimes or whose nationals are suspect will not be among the
first to ratify or otherwise agree to be bound by the Statute, if ever. Initially, at
least once the ICC is operative after the 60 ratifications have been deposited,
reliance will have to be placed on the Security Council in such cases. It is ironic
to hear the argument following the adoption of the Statute that Article 12 as it
stands, in effect without universal jurisdiction (the German Proposal) or auto~
matic jurisdiction including the acceptance as a State Party by the custodial
State (the Korean Proposal), "effectively lets off future Saddam Husseins or Pol
Pots, who kill their own people on their own territory, "99 from States that pro~
moted in the Conference even stricter criteria for preconditions to the exercise
of jurisdiction and were adamantly against universal jurisdiction or any variant
thereof. As a result of not adopting the German or Korean Proposals, the ICC
does, indeed, have less jurisdiction than domestic courts of any State would
have.
It is safe to say that the ICC will come into operation within the next two
years or so. As of May 2000 there are ninety~eight States that have signed and
ten that have ratified. IOO Once the Rules of Evidence and Procedure and Ele~
ments of Crimes have been completed by June 30, 2000, it seems certain that
many more States will ratify. As well, apart from awaiting the conclusion of the
Preparatory Commission established since Rome on these issues, many States
are in the process of enacting domestic legislation, or as a preliminary step de~
bating what is in substance involved in order to be able to fulfill their obliga~
tions to cooperate with the ICC in good faith. This process necessarily takes
time. In some States it requires not ordinary domestic legislation but constitu~
tional change. Among the contentious issues are the surrender to the ICC of
nationals by those States that ordinarily do not extradite such persons, the ne~
gation of immunity of Heads of State, other high ranking government officials
and even members of parliament, and the acceptance of life imprisonment as a
penalty.
During the PrepCom sessions during 1999 and March 2000, the United
States, together with other participating States, has been working actively and
constructively. Suggestions made after Rome that the preconditions to juris~
diction could be changed by the States Parties in a "binding interpretative
statement"101 have not been pressed. This has been the case also with the
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suggestion that a declarative statement could be made whereby third party ju,
risdiction would be suspended in the case where the State of nationality of the
alleged offender is both able and willing to assume responsibility for criminal
conduct which amounted to an official act. 102 This would, it has been argued,
simply "move the problem from the level of individual responsibility to that of
exclusive state responsibility" and consequently involve "a total change of the
parameters of responsibility"103 that were envisaged in Rome. The United
States would appear to have realized that to seek an amendment of the Rome
Statute to abrogate the perceived problem that it has with Article 12 is unreal,
istic and would not meet with support. However, most recently before the
March 2000 Prep Com, the United States made a demarche to other States in
their capitals in which it recalled that it had identified in its mind a number of
flaws in the Statute, but it was of the view that they could be dealt with in the
Rules of Evidence and Procedure and Elements of Crimes. It reiterated its fun'
damental difficulty with Article 12 and how it would make it nearly impossible
for the United States to give the ICC any measure of support if the Statute re,
mains as it is. It focussed its concerns again on the official decisions of a sover,
eign non,State Party being subjected to the jurisdiction of the Court in cases
where States that oppose. United States' actions abroad make unfounded accu,
sations. However, it was also the position of the United States that it shared the
concern of other States that any provision dealing with the consent of such a
non,State Party should not act as a vehicle for the alleged perpetrators of grave
atrocities to escape justice before the new Court. This concern is indeed valid,
but it is difficult to envisage how distinctions can be drawn between non, State
Parties, so' called "rogue" States or otherwise. All non, Party States could utilize
the United States perspective. It would seem that what the United States is
promoting is a clarification of the preconditions issue in a supplemental docu,
ment to the Rome Statute and in a Rule of Procedure. It seems that the sup'
plemental document envisaged is the Relationship Agreement Between the
United Nations and the ICC. This Relationship Agreement does not have to be
completed by June 30,2000. However, the Rule of Procedure would have to be.
To date nothing has formally been put on the table. The proposal for the proce,
dural rule relates to Article 98(2) of the Statute dealing with cooperation and
consent to surrender to the ICC. Article 98 (2) reads:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international
agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to
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surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain
the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.

The United States proposal would require a footnote to the Rule of Procedure to Article 98. The currently informal proposal reads:
The Court shall proceed with a request for surrender or an acceptance of a
person into the custody of the Court only in a manner consistent with its
obligations under the relevant international instrument.

This would then relate to a future proposal by the United States for the
supplemental document to be included in the Relationship Agreement
Between the United Nations and the ICC which would utilize the possibility
presented in the above proposed footnote to the Rule of Procedure. This
proposal reads:
The United Nations and the International Criminal Court agree that the Court
may seek the surrender or accept custody of a national who acts within the
sovereign direction of a U.N. Member State, and such directing State has so
acknowledged, only in the event (a) the directing State is a State Party to the
Statute or the Court obtains the consent of the directing State, or (b) measures
have been authorized pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter against the
directing State in relation to the situation or actions giving rise to the alleged crime
or crimes, provided that in connection with such authorization the Security
Council has determined that this subsection shall apply.

This is acutely controversial. Obviously, the best case scenario is for the
United States to become a State Party. Nevertheless, although many States
want to keep the United States positively engaged in the process of bringing the
ICC into operation, among the Like Minded States and others there are definite concerns, notably not wanting the delicate balance achieved in Rome to
be circumvented by the back door through an oblique Rule of Procedure to be
followed at some later stage by the Relationship Agreement Article. The end
result in reality would be that the ICC would only have jurisdiction with the
consent of the State of nationality of the accused or the United Nations Security Council. The United States proposal appears to remove or at least restrict
the jurisdictional provision concerning the State where the offence was committed. As was discussed earlier, Article 12 is in fact much narrower than what
most States wanted in Rome and this new "informal" proposal to produce a "procedural fix" to enable the United States to cooperate with the ICC, at a minimum as a "good neighbour"l04 creates more concerns about further restrictions.
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Furthermore, there are indeed very serious implications that the premise that
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed "within the sovereign di,
rection of a U.N. Member State" would not be in accord with the principle of
international law as encapsulated in the Nuremberg Principles, that the "Act
of State" plea is no defence.
The mandate of the PrepCom (1998,2000) is not to revise the Rome Statute
but to elaborate on it and thereby to encourage general support by States. The
Rules of Procedure and Evidence must be consistent with the Statute. Actual
amendments to the Statute can only be done by a Review Conference of the
Assembly of States Parties after the expiry of seven years from the entry into
force of the Statute. 105 Another major fear is that the United States proposal
would encourage certain States not to ratify as it would give them the power to
block the ICC's jurisdiction. It would also negate a key compromise in Rome
concerning the role of the Security Council in that the ICC would be subject to
the veto of the P5 over prosecutions of non,S tate Party nationals, which would
undermine the legitimacy of the Court as an impartial and independent judicial
body.
Thus, the major and as yet unresolved problem is how to accommodate the
concerns of the United States without undermining the integrity, credibility
and effectiveness of the ICC. With such a "procedural fix," the United States
has indicated in recent weeks that its "good neighbour policy" towards the ICC
could "mature over the years into the real possibility of signature and ratifica,
tion."106 By June 30, 2000 we shall see, at least, the outcome of this new pro'
posal concerning the Rules of Evidence and Procedure following debate if it is
formally tabled. If this happens it is difficult to know whether States will accept
the proposal to keep the United States on side, knowing that the Relationship
Agreement connection can be negotiated later--or just refuse to agree to this
procedural rule as a matter of principle.
The momentum is building and efforts worldwide are being made to ensure
ratification and thus secure accountability and justice by an independent, im,
partial and effective Court. It would be an affront to humanity, the rule of law
and to the modern struggle since 1947 to have established a permanent Inter,
national Criminal Court, if it was to be rendered in real operational terms a nul,
lity by procedural manoeuvres.
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